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When did Britain join the Occident? 
On the origins of the idea of ‘the West’ in English 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This article takes issue with the current orthodoxy that the idea of ‘the West’ as a 
supranational self-description based on civilizational commonality first emerged in 
English in the 1890s and 1900s in the context of the needs of British high 
imperialism. Instead it shows, first, that there were, already in the eighteenth century, 
some incipient attempts that groped towards a term denoting a distinctive West-
European cultural unity. It further argues, second, that such uses were rather casual 
and always interchangeable with overwhelmingly more references to ‘Europe’ as the 
supranational civilizational entity that the authors identified with, until -- roughly -- 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The first conscious and sustained attempts in 
Britain to articulate a distinctive ‘Western’ identity and a concept of ‘the West’ that 
was promoted as an alternative to the allegedly confusing term ‘Europe’ came in the 
1850s and 1860s as a result of the relentless activism of the British Comtists. Thus, 
while some of the first, relatively inconsistent, uses of ‘the West’ conform to the 
stereotype of celebrating a liberty-cherishing ‘West’, others -- the most sustained and 
consistent articulations of an idea of ‘the West’ -- were inspired by an overtly illiberal 
project. It also emerges that ‘the West’ was imported into English usage from 
Continental languages, where it had been employed earlier and more extensively. 
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‘Others, however, like Britain, might imagine themselves to be of the West but 
not of Europe’.1 
 
‘Messieurs, l’Angleterre est une île. Maintenant, vous en savez autant que moi 
sur son histoire.’ (Jules Michelet).2 
 




It is taken for granted by many (a) that Britain and America are the leading members 
of ‘the West’ or ‘Western Civilization’; and (b) that the ‘quintessence’ of the ‘West’ 
is a staunch attachment to liberty, democracy, human rights and related so-called 
‘Western values’. Both assumptions beg many questions and need challenging. In this 
article I wish to argue against a number of misrepresentations regarding both when a 
socio-political concept of ‘the West’ as a supranational self-description based on 
civilizational commonality emerged in English, and what it meant when it entered the 
																																																								
1 Mark B. Smith, The Russia Anxiety and how History can resolve it (London: Allen 
Lane, 2019), 195. 
2 ‘Gentlemen, England is an island. Now you know as much as I do about its history.’ 
(My translation). 
3 John E.E. Dalberg-Acton, Selected Writings of Lord Acton, Vol. III: Essays in 
Religion, Politics, and Morality (ed. J. Rufus Fears, Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty 
Classics, 1988), 644. 
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political and cultural vocabulary.4 I take issue with two different extreme positions. 
On the one hand there are those who think that people always talked of ‘the West’ as 
a civilizational and socio-political concept (or at least since the time of the ancient 
Greeks or/and Romans) and hence take the term and its meaning more or less for 
granted.5 On the other hand there are those who argue, as Kwame Anthony Appiah 
did very recently, that ‘[i]n English, the very idea of the “West,” to name a heritage 
and object of study, doesn’t really emerge until the 1880s and 1890s, during a heated 
era of imperialism’.6 Appiah follows the now established scholarly orthodoxy with 
regard to the timing of the emergence of the idea of the West as argued by 
Christopher GoGwilt, Alastair Bonnet and others who take their cue from them.7 
GoGwilt claimed (and Bonnett agreed) that the first sustained elaboration of ‘the 
West’ as a political and cultural unit was that found in books published by the social 
Darwinist Benjamin Kidd in 1894 and 1902.8 
																																																								
4 The uses of ‘the West’ (to mean something other than their own shifting Western 
frontier) came later in the US.  
5 For an example of how an East – West distinction is projected onto ancient Greek 
texts where it was absent (where, instead, a simple distinction between Greeks and 
‘barbarians’ was the case) see the following translation: ‘Πως ειπας; ου γαρ παν 
στρατευµα βαρβαρων περα τον Ελλης πορθµον Ευρωπης απο;’ (Greek original, 104). 
This was translated: ‘What do you mean? Hasn’t the whole of the Eastern army 
crossed back from Europe over the straight of Helle?’ (Translation, 105). Aeschylus, 
Persians, in: Aeschylus I [Persians, Seven Against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus 
Bound], ed. and trans. by Alan H. Sommerstein (Cambridge, Massachusetts: LOEB 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 2008), 104-105. Emphasis added. 
6 Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity: Creed, Country, 
Colour, Class, Culture (London: Profile Books, 2018), 200.  
7 Christopher GoGwilt, The Invention of the West: Joseph Conrad and the Double-
Mapping of Europe and Empire (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
1995); Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). For a recent distinguished historical work 
taking its cue from Bonnett see: Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the 
World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), 86-87, 933 n.36. 





I. Insular Britain versus Continental Occident 
 
Instead I will argue, first, that there were, already in the eighteenth century, some 
incipient attempts that groped towards a term denoting a distinctive West-European 
cultural unity, especially as a response to the entry of Russia into the political and 
cultural system of ‘Europe’ since the time of Peter the Great. I further argue, second, 
that these uses were rather casual and always accompanied by, and interchangeable 
with, overwhelmingly more references to ‘Europe’ as the supranational civilizational 
entity that the authors identified with, until -- roughly -- the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Such uses intensified as of the early nineteenth century, without directly or 
explicitly opposing themselves to the dominant collective self-description of 
‘Europe’. They coexisted with ‘Europe’ and were employed in parallel with it. 
However, the first conscious and sustained attempts in Britain to articulate a 
distinctive ‘Western’ identity and a concept of ‘the West’ that was promoted as an 
alternative to the allegedly confusing term ‘Europe’ came as of the 1850s and 1860s 
thanks to the relentless activism of the British followers of the French philosopher and 
founder of Positivism, Auguste Comte.9 A third and related argument is that, besides 
Positivism itself having been imported from France, the authors who had most often 
used ‘West’ or ‘Western’ in English (no matter how casually or inconsistently), 




9 See Georgios Varouxakis, ‘The Godfather of “Occidentality”: Auguste Comte and 
the Idea of “the West”’, Modern Intellectual History, 16/2 (2019): 411-441. 
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had lived in Continental Europe or were deeply influenced by Continental thought 
and mastered one or more of the Continent’s languages.10 
What emerges in relation to the theme of Britain and European liberty is a 
complex picture, which challenges dominant stereotypes. While some of the first uses 
of ‘the West’ in a socio-political sense conform to the widespread picture of 
celebrating a liberty-cherishing ‘West’, others – those, moreover, representing the 
most sustained and consistent articulations of an idea of ‘the West’ -- were inspired 
by an overtly illiberal project. Meanwhile, to add to the paradoxes or surprises, the 
rival supranational self-description ‘Europe’ had emerged in late-seventeenth-century 
England as part of an explicitly Whig political discourse promoting William III as the 
defender of the liberties of Europe. 
It is important to stress from the beginning that there is a clear difference 
between uses of ‘the West’ in English on the one hand, and uses of equivalent terms 
in French or German on the other. In the latter languages, uses of l’Occident or der 
Okzident/das Abendland were much more common in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, as well as earlier.11 I attribute the difference to the fact that, 
																																																								
10 It should go without saying that I by no means assume that there is one ‘idea of the 
West’ in general or in British debates in particular. Instead I analyse the various uses 
of ‘the West’ and related concepts and the intentions with which these terms were 
employed. 
11 Jürgen Fischer, Oriens – Occidens - Europa: Begrieff und Gedanke “Europa” in 
der Späten Antike und im frühen Mittelalter (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1957); 
see also: M. Schulze Wessel, ‘Westen; Okzident’, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie, ed. by Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer and Gottfried Gabriel, Vol. 12 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004), 661-672. On German thought 
in particular -- and on the more recent uses of a third related term, ‘der Westen’ -- see: 
Riccardo Bavaj and Martina Steber (eds.), Germany and ‘The West’: The History of a 
Modern Concept (Oxford: Berghahn, 2015). See also Heinz Gollwitzer, Europabild 
und Europagedanke: Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. Und 19. 
Jahrhunderts (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1964). For early French uses of ‘l’Occident’ see: 
[D’Alembert,] Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des 
Métiers, nouvelle impression en fascimilé de la première édition de 1751-1780, 
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1988, Vol. XI, 331; Pierre Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire 
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given that England/Britain was not part of Charlemagne’s Empire (nor of the later 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation), the word was less available and less 
attractive as part of the country’s own past than it was in German or in French. It is 
probably not accidental that, in the nineteenth century, French authors would come up 
with federal solutions to Europe’s problems that would take the shape of the 
resurrection of the ‘Western Empire’ with France as its leader.12 It had by then (not 
least through Napoleon’s efforts) become entrenched in French national mythology 
that France was the descendant and successor of Charlemagne’s ‘Empire of the West’, 
while simultaneously it was claiming the older mantle of Latin Rome.13 ‘The West’ or 
‘the Western Empire’ was part of what nineteenth-century French thinkers or 
politicians regarded as their own national past. Such co-option through elective 
affinities was impossible for insular Britons. 
 
II. Early uses of ‘West’ and ‘western’ 
 
Of course ‘west’ and ‘western’ had been used in English (or in Latin texts written by 
English authors) in a geographical sense. John Milton referred to ‘this goodly tower 
of a Common-wealth, which the English boasted they would build, to overshaddow 
kings, and be another Rome in the west’. But ‘the west’ was clearly used in a 
geographical sense in Milton’s sentence. Moreover, when, in that same page, Milton 
																																																																																																																																																														
Universel du XIXe Siècle , XI Deuxième partie, Geneva – Paris, 1982  [Reimpression 
de l’édition de Paris, 1866-79], 1210-1211. 
12 F. Dumons, Un Mot à propos de la Question d’Orient sur le Devoir de la France et 
l’Avenir de l’Europe (Bordeaux: A. Pechade, 1840); Arthur de Grandeffe, L’Empire 
d’Occident Reconstitué: Ou L’Équilibe Européen Assuré par l’Union des Races 
Latines (Paris: Ledoyen, 1857). 
13 Claude Nicolet, La fabrique d’une nation: La France entre Rome et les Germains 
(Paris: Perrin, 2006), 96-99, 145-153; see also: James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire 
(London: Macmillan, 1928 [1864]), 403-404. 
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referred to the supranational community that the English should beware of being 
ridiculed in front of, it was ‘the common laughter of Europ’ that he was worried 
about.14 The geographical sense also prevailed when Adam Smith wrote that ‘Greece, 
and the Greek colonies in Sicily, Italy, and the Lesser Asia, were the first countries 
which, in these western parts of the world, arrived at a state of civilized society.’15 
Moreover there are some few examples where, besides geography, even historical or 
cultural similarities among the nations of  ‘western Europe’ might be implied. Francis 
Bacon referred to ‘nos, occidentales...Europæ nationes’ or ‘nos Europæos 
occidentales’.16 In the Conclusion to the Second Part of Leviathan (1651), Thomas 
Hobbes referred to ‘these Western parts, that have received their Morall learning from 
Rome, and Athens’.17 
 Some rare uses that do grope towards a distinction between Western Europe 
and other parts, beyond, did begin to emerge more clearly in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century. They appeared in the context of suspicion of the newcomer into 
the political and cultural table of ‘Europe’, Russia. One of the most striking uses 
occurs in an epistolary novel by the Irish writer Oliver Goldsmith. Given that the 
novel began being published in the Public Ledger in 1760, it appeared earlier than 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s expression of deep pessimism about the long-term prospects 
																																																								
14 John Milton, The Readie & Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth (1660), 
in: Complete Prose Works of John Milton, VII (volume editor Robert W. Ayers, New 
Haven and London, 1980), 357. 
15 Adam Smith, ‘History of Astronomy’ in: Essays on Philosophical Subjects, edited 
by W.P.D. Wightman and J.C. Bryce, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), 51.  
16 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (1620), in: The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. by 
James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, London 1872), I,  
186, 187. 
17 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (edited by Richard Tuck, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 254.  
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of Peter the Great’s reforms in Du Contrat Social (1762).18 The main comparisons are 
between the Chinese and ‘the Europeans’, or between China and ‘Europe’. When a 
juxtaposition with Russia was the subject, however, ‘Europe’ alternated with ‘the 
western parts of Europe’. In ‘LETTER LXXXVII’ we read one putative 
correspondent censuring ‘the people of Europe’ for their habit, when at war with one 
another, to ‘apply to the Russians, their neighbours and ours, for assistance.’ For all 
subsidies that ‘the people of Europe’ paid for such aid, were strengthening the 
Russians. And that was a bad idea, given that: ‘I cannot avoid beholding the Russian 
empire, as the natural enemy of the more western parts of Europe’.19 He added: ‘It 
was long the wish of Peter, their great monarch, to have a fort in some of the western 
parts of Europe; many of his schemes and treaties were directed to this end; but, 
happily for Europe, he failed in them all.’ Success would have been fatal, because: ‘A 
fort, in the power of this people, would be like the possession of a flood-gate’, as 
‘they might then be able to deluge the whole western world with a barbarous 
inundation.’20 Even here, in the most striking case of a differentiation between two 
																																																								
18 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion (6 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999-2015), II, 72-82, 395-6; Henry Laurens, Orientales (Paris: 
CNRS Éditions, 2007), 17-19. There were many accounts of Russia in previous 
centuries, most of them negative (see Francine-Dominique Liechtenhan, ‘La Russie, 
ennemi héréditaire de la chrétienté? La diffusion de l’image de la Moscovie en 
Europe occidentale aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles’, Revue Historique, T. 285, Fasc. 1 
(577) (Jan.-March 1991): 77-103. For works comparing the periods before and after 
Peter, see: Dieter Groh, Russland und das Selbstverständnis Europas: Ein Beitrag zur 
europäischen Geistesgeschichte (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1961); 
M.S. Anderson, Britain’s Discovery of Russia 1553-1815 (London: Macmillan, 
1958). 
19 Emphasis added: [Oliver Goldsmith,] The Citizen of the World: Or, Letters from a 
Chinese Philosopher, residing in London, to his Friends in the East (2 vols, London: 
R. Whiston, J. Woodfall, T. Baldwin, R. Johnston, and G. Caddel, 1785 [1762]), I, 
180-185. 
20 Emphasis added: [Goldsmith,] The Citizen of the World, 103-105. See also 
Anderson, Britain’s Discovery of Russia, 123-124. Anderson argues that Goldsmith’s 
was one of two isolated cases among a generally positive attitude towards Russia at 
the time (ibid., 122-124). 
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parts within -- the author’s contemporary -- Europe, there is no gainsaying the 
alternation between ‘Europe’ and ‘the western parts of Europe’ to denote the 
advanced part of the world that was threatened by alleged Russian designs. There was 
no fully-fledged distinction yet, between ‘Western Europe’ versus ‘Eastern Europe’, 
let alone any fully articulated concept of ‘the West’ to describe a contemporary 
supranational community founded on civilizational commonality. 
 The distinction introduced (even partially and half-inconsistently) by 
Goldsmith was rather exceptional for the mid-eighteenth century, but it was to 
become much more common and pronounced progressively in the nineteenth century. 
It was a distinction within Europe between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. 
Following Peter the Great’s reforms, Russia had been admitted as part of ‘Europe’. 
Those who were uneasy with Russia being thus identified as ‘European’ began to look 
for ways to distinguish between themselves and the political-cum-cultural newcomer. 
In the eighteenth century, however, the vast majority of authors were thinking in 
terms of a North-South distinction in their mental maps of Europe.21 And within that 
scheme, Russia was seen as a ‘Northern’ power in the eighteenth century – and well 
into the nineteenth. 
The term ‘the West’, tout court, does appear in as major and influential a work 
in the late eighteenth century as Edward Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire (1776-1788). And it appears with a vengeance, innumerable times. 
However, it is used in a specific sense. ‘The West’ begins to appear in Gibbon’s 
																																																								
21 Hans Lemberg, ‘Zur Entstehung des Osteuropabegriffs im 19. Jahrhundert Vom 
“Norden” zum “Osten” Europas,’ Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 33 (1985): 
48-91; Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of 
Russia in France (c. 1740-1880) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006). For a work arguing that 
the distinction was already there in the eighteenth century see: Larry Wolff, Inventing 
Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
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narrative once the Roman Empire was divided into Western and Eastern Empires (395 
CE), to denote the Roman Empire of the West. And then it continues to be used with 
reference to the Germanic conquests in the territories of the former Western empire 
and subsequently the pretender successor realms in Western Europe, Charlemagne’s 
empire and the later Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, as well as the 
French. Gibbon chose to concentrate in the last two volumes of his History on the 
Eastern Empire.22 But even with that Eastern focus, ‘the West’ is ubiquitous through 
its interactions with the empire of Constantinople – the Crusades being part of those 
interactions. In other words, Gibbon’s ‘West’ was a  (long) phase in the history that 
he was writing. It was used in contradistinction with the Eastern Roman 
(Byzantine/Greek) Empire. But Gibbon did not use ‘the West’ to describe the 
supranational civilizational entity whose member he felt he was in the eighteenth 
century. For that, there was another word. 
At the end of the third volume (1781), Gibbon inserted his ‘General 
Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West’.23 There he proposed to 
enquire whether such re-barbarization of his part of the world could occur again: 
It is the duty of a patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory 
of his native country: but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, 
and to consider Europe as one great republic,24 whose various inhabitants 
																																																								
22 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion; J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Barbarians and the Redefinition 
of Europe: A Study of Gibbon’s Third Volume’, in: Larry Wolf and Marco Cipolloni 
(eds), The Anthropology of the Enlightenment (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 35-70; Pocock, ‘Some Europes in Their History’, in: 
Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 55-71. 
23 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (3 vols, ed. David 
Womersley, London, 1994), II, 508-516. The ‘General Observations’ were written 
several years before the composition of the third volume to which they were attached: 
see: Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, II, 392-6. 
24 Emphasis added. 
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have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation. The balance 
of power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own, or the 
neighbouring kingdoms, may be alternately exalted or depressed; but these 
partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the 
system of arts, and laws, and manners, which so advantageously distinguish, 
above the rest of mankind, the Europeans and their colonies.25  
He went on to concede that: ‘The savage nations of the globe are the common 
enemies of civilized society; and we may enquire with anxious curiosity, whether 
Europe is still threatened with a repetition of those calamities, which formerly 
oppressed the arms and institutions of Rome.’26 His verdict was that there were 
crucial differences between the Romans of old and the Europeans of his own time, 
and those differences led him to argue that the latter were safe. The Romans had been 
‘ignorant of the extent of their danger, and the number of their enemies.’ Beyond the 
Rhine and Danube, ‘the northern countries of Europe and Asia were filled with 
innumerable tribes of hunters and shepherds, poor, voracious, and turbulent; bold in 
arms, and impatient to ravish the fruits of industry.’ But in his own time ‘[s]uch 
formidable emigrations no longer issue from the North’. Instead of ‘some rude 
villages’, Germany in his time could display ‘a list of two thousand three hundred 
walled towns’. What was more, ‘Russia now assumes the form of a powerful and 
civilized empire.’27 In addition, Europeans were in his time living in different and 
diverse states and could not be conquered in one go as Rome had been. All this meant 
that: ‘If a savage conqueror should issue from the deserts of Tartary, he must 
repeatedly vanquish the robust peasants of Russia, the numerous armies of Germany, 
																																																								
25 Emphasis added: Gibbon, Decline and Fall, II, 511. 
26 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, II, 511. 
27 Emphasis added: ibid., 512. 
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the gallant nobles of France, and the intrepid freemen of Britain; who, perhaps, might 
confederate for their common defense.’28 
Clearly, when he wrote the ‘General Observations’ in the early 1770s, Gibbon 
did not share Goldsmith’s or Rousseau’s apprehensions about Russia a decade earlier. 
On Peter’s reforms, he was rather with Voltaire, the author of the Histoire de 
l’Empire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand (1760-72).29 Here at least, Gibbon talked of 
Russia as part of the civilized Europe that he was optimistic about – and he even 
included it as one of the countries that ‘perhaps, might confederate for their common 
defense’, along with Germany, France and Britain.30 
 
III. ‘The liberties of Europe’ and the North – South orientation 
 
What has been said in the previous section does not mean that Gibbon did not have a 
Western-Europe-centric view of history. He did and, as Karen O’Brien has shown, 
one of the features that distinguishes him from his Scottish contemporaries was his 
refusal fully to accept their generic ‘progress of society’ (or stadial-history) 
explanations that could apply potentially to all societies. Gibbon thought, instead, that 
																																																								
28 Emphasis (all five times)  added: ibid., 513-14.  
29 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Vol. 2, 396; ibid., 72-82. 
30 Interestingly, more than a century later, one of Comte’s British disciples saw 
Gibbon as a precursor of the founder of Positivism in conceptualizing Europe as a 
republic. But he also noted crucial differences, remarking that Comte gave the idea ‘a 
definiteness, an exactness, which Gibbon’s language does not express, and which 
cannot be realized except by reference to Comte’s theory of history.’ Henry Ellis, 
‘Comte’s Conception of Western Europe as a Republic’, Positivist Review, VI, no. 
LXV (May 1, 1898): 88-93, at 89. And, even more to the point: ‘It is, however, 
essential to remember that the republic thus alluded to is the republic of Western 
Europe – is limited, that is, to the nations which had been more or less Catholicised; 
whereas Gibbon speaks loosely of “Europe” – a geographical term which would 
embrace Russia and Turkey; is incompatible with any idea of republican community 
of thought and life; and has not the historical significance attaching to Comte’s 
definition.’ Ibid., 91. 
	 13	
the history of the ‘Europe’ that emerged from the merger of the ruins of the Western 
Roman Empire with the Germanic ‘barbarians’ who conquered it was a contingent 
and unique story of a singularly progressive civilization.31 But he followed the 
common practice of his contemporaries and called the eventual outcome of that West-
European story ‘Europe’.32 
In thinking in terms of ‘Europe’ Gibbon was typical of eighteenth-century 
British thinkers. Though ‘Europe’ had been used from time to time sporadically in 
earlier centuries,33 the dominant self-description used to name the overarching supra-
national cultural entity or wider community that West-European thinkers identified 
with was ‘Christendom’, certainly until the end of the seventeenth century. From that 
time onwards, ‘Europe’ came to compete with – though by no means completely to 
supersede  – ‘Christendom’. One explanation for the popularity of ‘Europe’ as of the 
late seventeenth century was that it was part of a process of secularisation.34 But in 
Britain in particular, the popularity of ‘Europe’ was also related to the need for the 
Whigs to find a term different than ‘Christendom’, given that the King of France was 
presented by their (Jacobite) opponents as the defender of ‘Christendom’, the Most 
Christian King. As a response, the Whigs began to call William III the defender of the 
																																																								
31 Karen O’Brien, Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire 
to Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), 167-203. 
32  Cf. Pocock, ‘Some Europes’, 62-67 [‘The Enlightened Narrative’]. 
33 Noel Malcolm, Useful Enemies: Islam and the Ottoman Empire in Western 
Political Thought, 1450-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 59-60; Denys 
Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (2nd edition, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1968).  
34 Heinz Gollwitzer, ‘Zur Wortgeschichte und Sinndeutung von “Europa”’, Saeculum, 
2 (1951): 161-72; Peter Burke, ‘Did Europe exist before 1700?’, History of European 
Ideas, 1 (1980): 21-29.  
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liberties of ‘Europe’.35 John Toland was only one of many who referred to William III 
as ‘both the restorer and supporter of the Liberty of Europe’ (1700).36 
In what I have argued so far I refer to uses of ‘the West’ as a socio-political 
supranational category rather than to whether or not there was an East-West 
orientation in people’s geographical consciousness (a related, but different question). 
An East-West orientation was common in Greek and Roman antiquity, when ‘from 
Cadiz to the Ganges’ was the usual way of speaking of the whole oikoumenê.37 On the 
other hand, by the eighteenth century, when people were clear about the location of 
the North and South poles, Edward Gibbon could confidently write (in 1790 or 1791) 
on the margins of his own famous book: 
 The distinction of North and South is real and intelligible; and our pursuit is 
terminated on either side by the poles of the Earth. But the difference of East 
and West is arbitrary, and shifts round the globe. As the men of the North not 
the West38 the legions of Gaul and Germany were superior to the south-
eastern39 natives of Asia and Egypt. It is the triumph of cold over heat; which 
may however and has been surmounted by moral causes.40   
																																																								
35 H.D. Schmidt, ‘II. The Establishment of “Europe” as a Political Expression’, The 
Historical Journal, 9/2 (1966): 172-78. See also Wout Troost, ‘“To Restore and 
Preserve the Liberty of Europe”: William III’s Ideas on Foreign Policy’, in: David 
Onnekink and Gijs Rommelse (eds), Ideology and Foreign Policy in Early Modern 
Europe (1650-1750) (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 283-303; Paul Stock, Europe and the 
British Geographical Imagination, 1760-1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 143. 
36 Emphasis in original: John Toland, ‘To the Lord Mayor, Adelmen, Sherifs, and 
Common Council of London’, in: The Oceana of James Harrison and His Other 
Works…, edited by John Toland (London, 1700), viii. 
37 G.W. Bowersock, ‘The East-West Orientation of Mediterranean Studies and the 
Meaning of North and South in Antiquity’, in: W.V. Harris (ed.), Rethinking the 
Mediterranean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 167-78. 
38 Emphasis added. 
39 Underlined in the original. 
40 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, III, Appendix 2, 1095. 
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The original text, on which this was a marginal comment read: ‘In all levies [of 
soldiers], a just preference was given to the climates of the North over those of the 
South’.41 These statements are typical of a very long tradition. In 1576, Jean Bodin 
was following and summarising longstanding Mediaeval theories when, in Six Books 
of the Republic, he insisted that (and explained why) the North – South divide was 
much more important than the West – East divide.42 That mind-set and orientation 
took a long time to change and it only changed in the course of the nineteenth century 
towards the now more familiar East – West distinction. 
 That transition was gradual and slow. While the epithet ‘western’ in 
contradistinction with ‘eastern’ might appear from time to time, used in a 
geographical sense, and while ‘western parts’ or ‘western world’, to describe the part 
of the world one was referring to, would sometimes be used, socio-political uses of 
‘the West’ or ‘Western Civilization’ were very rare in early- and mid-nineteenth-
century British writings. In his widely discussed History of Civilization in England, 
whose first volume was published in 1857, H.T. Buckle nowhere mentioned ‘Western 
Civilization’ or ‘the West’. Instead, besides talking of national civilizations 
(‘English’, French, American, German), his major generalization was that referring to 
the differences between ‘European civilization’ and ‘the non-European division’ of 
civilization (or between ‘the East’ and ‘Europe’).43 Though it was that very year that 
																																																								
41 Ibid., I, p. 39.  
42 Jean Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonwheale [A Fascimile reprint of the English 
translation of 1606...] (ed. dy Kenneth Douglas Mc Rae, Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), 545-68. On the tradition Bodin was following see: Mirian J. 
Tooley, ‘Bodin and the Mediaeval Theory of Climate’, Speculum, 28/1 (1953): 64-83. 
43 Henry Thomas Buckle, History of Civilization in England (3 vols, London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1869). 
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Richard Congreve published two pamphlets promoting a different term,44 Buckle’s 
use was still the norm. 
 
IV. Different ‘others’: 
 ‘The West’ versus ‘Northern’/‘Eastern’ Russia, Oriental Jews, and Turkey 
 
Meanwhile, there were some early manifestations of uses that were to become much 
more common some decades later. And there was a particular context in which they 
arose, as of the early 1830s. Russia had become very unpopular because of the way it 
suppressed the Polish uprising of 1830-31 and then suspended the Kingdom of 
Poland’s special constitutional status that the Treaty of Vienna had stipulated. One of 
the factors that would affect debates in Britain and France from 1831 onwards would 
be the immense sympathy with Poland in both countries and the assiduous 
campaigning of great numbers of Polish refugees (many of them highly sophisticated 
and well connected members of the Polish aristocracy).45 Then, in 1833, Russia 
caused the other powers shockwaves of anxiety by managing to capitalise on the 
threat posed to the Ottoman Empire by Mehemet Ali of Egypt and provisionally turn 
the Sultan to all intents and purposes into its protégé. For a short period Russia was 
allowed to station military forces around Constantinople and then signed the Treaty of 
																																																								
44 See infra, Section VI. 
45 Adam Gielgud (ed.), Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and his Correspondence 
with Alexander I (2nd edition, 2 vols, London: Remington, 1888), II, 316-336; M. 
Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770-1861 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1955), 193-250; John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia 
in Great Britain: A Study in the Interaction of Policy and Opinion (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1950). 
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Unkiar Skelessi (Hünkâr İskelesi) with the Porte.46 Two decades later the Crimean 
War would both be a result and an additional cause of Russophobia for most British 
commentators.47 
Thus, in most of the limited cases when the terms ‘West’ and ‘Western’ were 
used in Britain in the 1830s and 1840s the reason why they were employed usually 
involved (a juxtaposition to) Russia. For a short time Foreign Secretary Palmerston 
spoke of the treaty of alliance that he forged between Britain, France, Spain and 
Portugal in 1834 as ‘a quadruple alliance among the constitutional states of the West, 
which will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the East’ (or as ‘a 
formal union between the four constitutional states of the West to drive absolutism 
out of the [Iberian] Peninsula’).48 It is most likely that the use was imported from the 
discourse of Palmerston’s French interlocutors and allies, who were talking much of a 
‘Western’ alliance between the constitutional powers of France and Britain at the time 
in question.49 Like the expression ‘the Eastern Question’ itself, it is likely that the 
‘Western’ alliance came to Palmerston from the language of his French counterpart, 
the Duc de Broglie, and the French ambassador in London, Talleyrand, with whom he 
was in constant negotiations throughout that time.50 Another Continental source of 
																																																								
46 Alexander Bitis, Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society 
1815-1833 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 465-479; Gleason, Genesis of 
Russophobia, 135-163. 
47 See Orlando Figes, Crimea: The Last Crusade (London: Allen Lane, 2010). 
48 Quoted in: Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841: Britain, 
the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question, 2 vols (London, 1951), I, 397. 
49 For a very explicit evocation of a new distinction between Western and Eastern 
Europe emerging from the outcome of the French Revolution of 1830 (due to France 
having, as a result of it, become a constitutional monarchy like Britain)  see: Baron 
Sirtema de Grovestins, La Pologne, la Russie et l’Europe Occidentale: ou De la 
Nécessité de résoudre la Question Russo-Polonaise dans une Conférence des 
Grandes Puissances (Paris: Amyot, 1847), 216-18. 
50 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand (5 
volumes, ed. by the Duc de Broglie, trans. by Mrs Angus Hall, New York and 
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Palmesrson’s language may have been Prince Adam Czartoryski, the Polish leader 
living in exile in London and Paris after the suppression of the Polish uprising of 
1830-31 and assiduously advising Palmerston on the unavoidable struggle between 
what he was describing as the liberal West and the despotic East.51 But, at any rate, 
Palmerston alternated between calling the other side (Russia, Prussia and Austria) ‘the 
Eastern Powers’ and ‘the three Northern Powers’ 52  – typically displaying the 
inchoateness of these distinctions in the early nineteenth century. Most others also 
referred to Russia, Prussia and Austria as ‘the Northern Powers’ or ‘Northern Courts’ 
at the time.53 
One of the people who sometimes employed the term ‘Western’ from early on 
was the highly idiosyncratic activist and politician, David Urquhart. His Russophobia 
became proverbial as of the 1830s. 54  His impact was considerable, and those 
captivated by the charms of his magnetic personality included King William IV. 
Urquhart referred to ‘the Empires of the West’, ‘the Western nations’, or ‘the Powers 
of the West’ when he wanted to make a distinction between France and Britain on the 
one hand, and Russia (which he loathed) or the Ottoman Empire (which he admired) 
																																																																																																																																																														
London: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1892), V, 166-311; see also Henry Laurens, ‘La 
Question d’Orient’, in: Alphonse de Lamartine, La Question d’Orient: Discours et 
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André Versaille, 2011), 7-58, at 18-20. On the first uses of ‘the Eastern Question’ see 
also: Holly Case, The Age of Questions (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press), 156, 290-291 n.15. See also Georgios Giannakopoulos, ‘Re-staging the 
“Eastern Question”’, in this issue. 
51 Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity, 229-32. 
52 Webster, Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 406. 
53 See, e.g., [Henry Rich] ‘History, Present Wrongs, and Claims of Poland’, The 
Edinburgh Review, 55/109 (April 1832): 220-270, at 243, 246, 248, 266, 267, 268; 
[David Urquhart], ‘Quadruple Treaty’, British and Foreign Review, 1/1 (July 1835): 
217-237, at 227, 228, 236; Talleyrand, Memoirs, V, 166-311. 
54 Gleason, Genesis of Russophobia, 153-57, 164-204, 257-66; Charles Webster, 
‘Urquhart, Ponsonby, and Palmerston’, The English Historical Review, 62/244 (July 
1947): 327-351; Margaret Lamb, ‘The Making of a Russophobe: David Urquhart: The 
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on the other.55 He did convince many of the Russian danger and Palmerston’s alleged 
role, including -- for a while and partially -- Karl Marx.56 The German-born and 
London-based Marx, meanwhile, was one of the authors writing in English -- not least 
for the New York Tribune -- in the 1850s using ‘West’ and ‘Western’ much more 
extensively than most native speakers did at that time.57 
 Sometimes ‘West’ or ‘western’ would be used in contradistinction to ‘Oriental’ 
Jews. Dr Thomas Arnold wrote to a correspondent that Providence had communicated 
‘all religious knowledge to mankind through the Jewish people’, and ‘all intellectual 
cultivation through the Greeks’. A propos he remarked that he had ‘occasion in the 
winter to observe this in a Jew, of whom I took a few lessons in Hebrew, and who was 
learned in the writings of the Rabbis, but totally ignorant of all the literature of the West, 
ancient and modern.’ The man in question was, Arnold continued, ‘consequently just 
like a child, -- his mind being entirely without the habit of criticism or analysis, whether 
as applied to words or to things; wholly ignorant, for instance, of the analysis of 
language, whether grammatical or logical; or of the analysis of a narrative of facts, 
according to any rules of probability external or internal.’58 
																																																								
55 David Urquhart, Recent Events in the East: Being a Reprint of Mr. Urquhart’s 
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There were other early users as well. In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the social theorist Harriet Martineau was writing to the poet and politician Richard 
Monckton Milnes ‘to ask a favour’: 
I want – much – to read again a political article of yours in a quarterly review, 
-- but cannot remember which review it was, nor its title. It is the article in 
wh[ich] you gave a broad & striking view of the conflict, natural & future, -- 
of the barbaric Eastern, with the civilized Western mind & empire. I know that 
your view has been given by you in many places;59 but this one, -- I think a 
review of Custine, -- is the exposition I want to read over again.60 
The article Martineau wished to read again was indeed striking in its juxtaposition of 
Russia with what the author repeatedly referred to as ‘Western civilization’. Milnes 
opined that despotic power had always been ‘repugnant to western civilization’. On 
the other hand what he wanted to draw attention to with regard to the Russians’ 
attitude to power was ‘its Oriental character’.61 And after treating his readers to a long 
list of features in Russia that he considered typically ‘Eastern’, Milnes added:  
And, above all, there is the strange and complicated array of the same feelings 
with which all these races have regarded Western civilization; the same 
ambitious hatred which precipitated Xerxes on Greece, the Turks on Europe, 
																																																								








61 [Richard Monckton Milnes,] ‘The Marquis de Custine’s Russia’, Edinburgh 
Review, 79/160 (1844): 351-396, at 369-70. 
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and the Czar on Poland;62 the same desire of rivalry which sent Peter into the 
Dutch dockyards, and has now filled Russia with copies…of Italian art, of 
French manners, of English intelligence – just as it has dressed the Turkish 
army in stocks and trousers…: the same jealous animosity of all that is felt to 
be beyond their reach;… Let, then, this consideration of the Oriental 
characteristics of the Russian people and institutions never be lost sight of;…63  
It would have been tempting to argue that Milnes used ‘Western’ as much as he did in 
this review article simply because he was borrowing the language of the French book 
that he was commenting on, Astolphe de Custine’s La Russie en 1839 (1843). This is 
prima facie plausible, given how strikingly often the Marquis de Custine used 
‘l’Occident’, or ‘civilisation occidentale’ in his 4-volume book – a book in fact 
considered to be one of the main milestones in the consolidation of a distinction 
between a ‘West’ of Europe versus an ‘oriental’ Russia.64 And yet, Milnes’s is a more 
interesting instance than just a case of him translating terms from the particular 
French work that he was reviewing.65 In 1832 he had travelled to Greece, then at the 
very beginning of its independent existence.66 Some of the poems he wrote and 
																																																								
62 Emphasis added. 
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published subsequently are striking for the purposes of what I am discussing here. 
This is how one of them ended:  
‘ O breezes of the wealthy West!67 
 Why bear ye not on grateful wings 
The seeds of all your life has blest 
Back to their being’s early springs? 
Why fill ye not these plains with hopes 
To bear the treasures once they bore, 
And to these Heliconian slopes 
Transport civility and lore? 
 
For now, at least, the soil is free, 
 Now that one strong reviving breath 
Has chased that Eastern tyranny 
 Which to the Greek was ever death:68 
Now that, though weak with age and wrongs, 
And bent beneath the recent chain, 
This motherland of Greece belongs 
 To her own western world again.’69 
This was unusual. For the Philhellenic British men of letters in the previous decade, 
the motto had been The Cause of Greece, the Cause of Europe -- as a 
																																																								
67 Emphasis added. 
68 Emphasis added. 
69 Emphasis added: From ‘The Flowers of Helicon’,  in: Richard Monckton Milnes, 
Selections from the Works of Lord Houghton (London: Edward Moxon, 1868), 142. 
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characteristically titled pamphlet they published in 1821 put it.70 In that widely 
circulated pamphlet,71 there were literally dozens of evocations of the European 
character and civilization of the Greeks in common with the people addressed by the 
pamphlet (European public opinion), and a smaller number of references to their 
shared belonging to Christendom (the author was a Professor of Theology at Leipzig). 
Meanwhile, there was no single mention of ‘the West’.72 And the Greek Declaration 
of Independence, issued in the beginning of 1822, again tried to appeal to the 
European and Christian commonalities between the Greeks and their aspired 
audience, but not a word was said on ‘the West’. The ‘western’ dimension that Milnes 
was to give the new state and the community it was supposedly re-joining was an 
innovation.  
 
V. Edward Freeman and the eternal struggle of ‘the West’ against ‘the East’ 
 
Another early case of persistent uses of ‘the West’ was that of the historian Edward 
Augustus Freeman, from the mid-1850s onwards. But even in the texts where he most 
solemnly posited an eternal struggle between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ Freeman’s use 
of the terms was peculiar and not consistent. He argued ‘that the whole history of 
Europe forms the record of one long struggle, a struggle of which the earliest known 
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phases will be found in the opening chapters of Herodotus, while the latest as yet will 
be found in the morning’s telegrams.’73 It was, he noted, ‘the present Lord Derby 
who, in a sneering fit, first spoke…of “the eternal Eastern question.”’ By so doing, 
Lord Derby had ‘stumbled on the happiest epithet that man ever lighted on.’ For 
Freeman, the ‘Eastern question’ was ‘indeed “eternal”’. It was, he went on, ‘in the 
cant of diplomatists, “awaiting its solution” at the first beginnings of recorded history; 
it is “awaiting its solution” still.’ To his mind, that ‘solution cannot come as long as a 
single rood of European and Christian soil is left in the grasp of barbarian intruders.’ 
Therefore: ‘The strife is indeed eternal. It is the strife between light and darkness, 
between freedom and bondage; it is the strife between the West and the East, between 
Europe and Asia,74 the strife which in its earliest days took the shape of the strife 
between Greek and barbarian, the strife which, for the last twelve centuries, has been 
sharpened to its keenest as the strife between Christendom and Islam.’75 The tale was 
‘the same in all ages, from the Plataean who gave his life for right at Marathon to the 
Russian who gave his life for right at Plevna.’  
It is clear from the reference to the battle of Plevna during the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877-78 that Freeman included Russia in ‘the West’ whose eternal struggle 
against ‘the East’ was the most striking feature of ‘the unity of history’ he was so 
vociferous about. And he knew that some would be surprised that an Englishman 
could ‘speak well of Russia’. But to him it seemed that Russia and its rulers were 
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‘simply like any other nation and its rulers, capable of righteous action at one moment 
and of unrighteous action at another.’76 
Freeman wrote of ‘the strife of East and West’ in several other works.77 
Though he is not discussed in that work, he offers an example of what Holly Case has 
referred to as the ‘misdating’ of ‘questions’ during what she calls ‘the age of 
questions’: ‘at the very instant they were born, questions were often endowed with a 
history that backdated them by decades, sometimes centuries, before their actual 
emergence.’78 Freeman backdated the ‘Eastern Question’ and the ‘strife of East and 
West’ by millennia. He was and is in good company.79 
 But when addressing distinctions within Europe and within Christendom, 
Freeman would use ‘Western’ in contradistinction to the Eastern Roman Empire. He 
was unusually sympathetic to the Empire of Constantinople. He complained about 
many of his contemporaries ‘showing how little they know of that mighty Empire 
which for so many ages cherished the flame of civilization and literature when it was 
well nigh extinct throughout Western Europe – which preserved the language of 
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Thucydides and Aristotle, and the political power of Augustus and Constantine, till 
the nations of the West were once more prepared to receive the gift and to despise the 
giver.’80 This did not mean that he ranked the Eastern Empire above the modern 
‘Teutonic’ realms, of course: ‘but, essentially conservative and unprogressive, it had 
not the same hope for the future which dwelled in the vigorous barbarism of the 
Western nations.’ Thus, ‘Its old age lived on alongside of the youth of the Western 
nations, till they had sufficiently advanced to give the world a lesson in a higher, and 
we trust, more enduring civilization.’ 81  Clearly, in his hierarchy, some of the 
‘Western’ nations (the ‘Teutonic’ ones especially) were superior, not least thanks to 
the free institutions they developed (with the English and their brethren in America 
leading the way). ‘Western’ was in these contexts used to distinguish between the two 
Roman Empires and their respective later successor states. However, these were both 
‘European-Aryan’ in Freeman’s terms, and, therefore, both ‘Western’ in the other 
sense in which he used the term, when it came to universal history’s ‘eternal strife’. 
That ‘West’ was represented (or led) by different actors-peoples in each epoch, and 
included – successively -- the ancient Greeks, Alexander’s empire, and both Roman 
empires, that of the East as well as that of the West (and in his own time by the 
Balkan Christians as well as – in the 1870s -- their Russian would-be protectors). 
Thus, talking of the East Roman Empire’s ‘great war with Persia’ in the early seventh 
century, Freeman commented: ‘The Roman had succeeded the Macedonian as the 
champion of the West against the East, and the work of that championship was as 
worthily done from the New Rome as from the Old.’82 The New Rome was, of 
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course, Constantinople. The ‘Emperor of the East’ (in the intra-Roman or intra-
European division), the so-called Byzantine Emperor, was ‘the champion of the West 
against the East’ in the broader, universal-historical eternal ‘strife between East and 
West’. That was not necessarily a widespread view among ‘Teutomaniacs’ at the 
time.83 
Moreover, the ‘West’ of the ‘eternal strife’ included the Slavs. Time and again 
in his writings on the Eastern Roman Empire Freeman wistfully commented how 
differently things would have turned out had the Slavs conquered Constantinople 
during one of their attempts instead of the Ottoman Turks. He repeatedly drew an 
analogy between the renewal of the Western Roman Empire by the conquering 
youthful Teutons and the (counterfactual) would-be renewal of the Eastern Roman 
Empire by the conquering youthful Slavs.84 Elsewhere, Freeman explained that, 
despite the initial racial or linguistic kinship of all Aryans, the ‘Western Aryans’ who 
lived in Europe had developed a different civilization from the ‘Eastern Aryans’ (‘the 
Persian and the Hindoo’).85 The Western Aryans ‘all form part of one historic world, 
the world of Rome. They all share, more or less fully, in the memories which are 
common to all who have been brought within the magic influence of either of the two 
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seats of Roman dominion.’86 Thus ‘All Europe, Eastern and Western’, had ‘a common 
right in Rome and in all that springs from Rome’.87 There had been two centres of 
roman influene, Old Rome and New Rome: ‘from the city of Romulus and from the 
city of Constantine, has come the civilization which distinguishes Europe from Africa 
and Asia. In that heritage all Europe has a share.’88 In the ‘eternal strife’, Freeman’s 
‘West’ was ‘Aryan Europe’, which included the Russians and other Slavs. 
Freeman sometimes jested about his lack of interest in other parts of the world, but 
retorted that the part he did study was not negligible: ‘Indian things are commonly 
beyond me. I am parochially minded; but my parish is a big one, taking in all civilized 
Europe and America’.89 He often referred to America next to Europe, as an extension 
of Europe and a ‘third home’ to the Teutonic English nation.90 But he did not use the 
term ‘the West’ to lump Europe and America together (as Comte and his followers 
did). The very fact that an author who used ‘the West’ as frequently as Freeman did 
included Byzantium and Russia as part of it is telling regarding the different and often 
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conflicting meanings of the term in the nineteenth century.91 The multiplicity of 
meanings and definitions continued in the twentieth century of course.92 
 
VI. The Comtists’ illiberal West  
 
And yet, there had emerged at around the same time a very different ‘West’. For 
meanwhile Comte (as of the 1840s) and some of his British followers (as of the 
1850s-1860s) opted for the term ‘the West’ to describe the entity they proposed to re-
organise, instead of the hitherto used term ‘Europe’, exactly because ‘Europe’ was 
simultaneously too broad (to the extent that it included Russia and Eastern Europe), 
and too narrow (to the extent that it did not include the two Americas and Australia-
New Zealand).93 There are other examples one could adduce of early uses of ‘the 
West’, some more casual than others, some more consistent than others. But the first 
time a conscious decision was made by a group of thinkers and political activists 
systematically to substitute the term ‘the West’ for ‘Europe’, and to define it in 
exhaustive detail in contradistinction with ‘Europe’, was when the British Comtists 
published their long volume on International Policy (1866), headed by the essay ‘The 
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‘Western’ in the 1870s comes much closer to later uses: ‘The view of land as 
merchantable property…seems to be not only modern but even now distinctly 
Western. It is most unreservedly accepted in the United States, with little less reserve 
in England and France, but, as we proceed through Eastern Europe, it fades gradually 
away, until in Asia it is wholly lost.’ Henry Sumner Maine, ‘The Effects of 
Observation of India on Modern European Thought’ (1875), in: Maine, Village-
Comunities in the East and West (7th edition, London: John Murray, 1895), 203-239, 
at 228. 
92 For an instructive twentieth-century example see Richard Toye, ‘“This famous 
island is the home of freedom”: Winston Churchill and the Battle for “European 
Civilization”’, in this issue.  
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West’, signed by their leader, Richard Congreve.94 There had been no such explicit 
and thorough definition of what ‘the West’ meant and what ‘it’ ought to become in 
English up to then -- and the closest to have come to anyone doing so, had been 
contributions by Congreve himself a decade earlier.95 And in the future it was only to 
be rivalled in the following decade by the English edition of Comte’s ultra-detailed 
four-volume System of Positive Polity (1875-1877), translated by some of the self-
same leading British disciples (John Henry Bridges, Frederic Harrison, Edward 
Spencer Beesly, Vernon Lushington, Godfrey Lushington, Fanny Hertz, Samuel 
Lobb, Richard Congreve, Henry Dix Hutton).96 The bewilderment of reviewers when 
it came to ‘the West’, to say nothing of ‘Occidentality’/’Westernness’ and other 
related terms that the Positivists attempted then to introduce into English political 
vocabulary, has been shown elsewhere.97 In that context it is important to emphasize 
how astonishingly widely known Comte’s work was, and how vociferous his British 
followers were. As Terence Wright has shown, ‘nearly all the major British thinkers 
of the second half of the nineteenth century seem to have studied Comte’. And ‘[n]o 
student, it was claimed, could “pass through the ’sixties untouched by curiosity about 
the new philosophical system”…and from 1860 to 1880 it seemed impossible for any 
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& Co., 1874), 1-65. 
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major “literary or scientific figure who ventured into public controversy” not to 
“defend his position in relation to Positivism”.’ Thus, in the later nineteenth century, 
‘it became almost impossible for educated people not to have encountered Comte’s 
ideas.’98 
In the Conclusion of her widely cited article arguing for a Russian origin of 
the idea of the West in the West, Peggy Heller wrote that ‘even in the British context, 
the West did not emerge simply out of the discourse of imperialists, but played an 
important role in anti-imperialism.’99 In a note attached to that statement she added 
that: ‘The anti-imperialism of some of the early accounts of Western civilisation, such 
as Francis Sydney Marvin’s…has not been appreciated in the work of GoGwilt or 
Bonnett.’ (Then she went on to suggest a probable Russian influence, calling for 
further research to establish it).100 Heller was right to point to the significant anti-
imperialist current of thought among people who wrote extensively on ‘the West’ and 
‘Western Civilization’ around the time of the First World War. But she was wrong to 
look for the sources of their combination of anti-imperialism and focus on ‘the 
West’/‘Western Civilization’ in Russian connections. Francis Sydney Marvin was 
indeed one of the most prolific authors writing on Western Civilization during and 
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around the Great War. He was also a well-known and highly active Comtist.101 He 
contributed more than a hundred articles to the Comtist Positivist Review between 
1893 and 1925. And besides publishing books on The Unity of Western Civilization, 
and similar titles,102 he also authored a book on Comte.103 The link between British 
anti-imperialism and British writings on the West and Western Civilization in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the legacy of Auguste Comte.104 
 
VII. The wages of foreign influence  
 
One more observation suggests itself in the light of what this article has shown. 
Comtist Positivism had come to Britain from France. Hobbes had lived for years in 
France before he published Leviathan (a book written in France); Goldsmith had 
spent some years in the Netherlands and other parts of Continental Europe before he 
wrote A Citizen of the World. Gibbon had spent many years in Switzerland and his 
Continental credentials were notorious.105  Milnes, besides long sojourns on the 
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Continent, had studied in Bonn before his first visit to Greece.106 Urquhart had lived 
in Switzerland and France for several formative years; and ‘his education and whole 
experience were continental’.107 Marx was German. Thomas Arnold was immersed in 
German thought and strongly influenced by Barthold Georg Niebuhr, Christian von 
Bunsen and other German scholars. So was his staunch admirer, Freeman.108 And 
Maine’s debts to the German historical school of law of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 
to Georg Ludwig von Maurer and to Niebuhr’s Roman History are well known.109 
The ‘comparative method’ so dear to Freeman and Maine owed its appeal to the 
philological researches into the ‘Aryan’ languages of Bunsen and Friedrich Max 
Müller, both Germans based and highly influential in Britain.110 These examples may 
at least indicate that the earliest uses of ‘the West’ and ‘Western’ came to Britain 
from Continental European languages and discourses, in which they were much more 
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common. Lord Acton was of course right that ideas are ‘extraterritorial’. As far as 




It should be clear from the evidence adduced in this article that there were several 
different uses of ‘the West’ in British thought in the nineteenth century and that they 
did not all mean the same thing or entity. And it should also be clear by now that most 
of them were inchoate or incoherent uses, which juxtaposed an undefined ‘West’ 
(most of the time used interchangeably, without any differentiation, with ‘Europe’) 
against various ‘others’ (Eastern Roman Empire of the medieval ‘Greeks’, or Russia, 
or the Jews, the Saracens, or ‘the Turk’) with rarely defined and often contradictory 
criteria of selection or membership. The only conscious and thorough attempt at a 
comprehensive definition of an entity that they proposed to call ‘the West’ was that 
undertaken by the Comtists, in the footsteps of their French master. There is an irony 
in all this with regard to the theme of Britain and European liberty. As we noted 
(Section II), most of the first uses of ‘Europe’ as a supranational self-description arose 
in England in the late seventeenth century very much in relation to the theme of 
liberty. But when ‘the West’ came to be programmatically promoted, it was to very 
different purposes. Far from conforming to the widely-held belief that Britons 
invented ‘the West’ to celebrate their primacy in liberal credentials or to legitimize 
their empire, the first time a coherent and thoroughly elaborate idea of the West was 
explicitly promoted in Britain, it was as part of the ‘liberticide’ as well as anti-
imperialist system proposed by Comte.111  
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